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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF THIRD PARTY
COHABITATION ON ALIMONY PAYMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The modem concept of alimony is not founded on punitive justice,
but rather is designed to provide maintenance for the dependent spouse
until that individual becomes self-supporting.' Alimony is not
awarded to support a third party.2 The growing incidence of cohabita-
tion3 and its acceptance by society has forced state legislatures and
courts to balance the policy of providing economic security to the de-
pendent ex-spouse with the policy of ensuring fairness to the paying ex-
spouse. As a result, many state courts have re-evaluated their rules on
termination or modification of support payments when the recipient
cohabitates with a third party. Some state legislatures are enacting
laws to aid the courts.
The Oklahoma legislature enacted such a statute which became
effective October 1, 1979. 4 This statute provides for the termination or
reduction of support payments when the recipient cohabitates with a
member of the opposite sex, and a substantial change of economic need
or ability to pay can be shown.'
This comment compares the statutory and nonstatutory tests of
various jurisdictions for terminating alimony for cohabitation with a
third party and analyzes the implications of the untested Oklahoma
statute. It appears that the provisions of the Oklahoma statute are trig-
gered solely on the basis of conduct. This comment argues that sexual
conduct after divorce should not affect alimony payments unless a di-
minished economic need is realized by the payee within the relation-
ship. This comment does not attempt to analyze the possible
1. H. Clark, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14.5 (1968).
2. See Garlinger v. Garlinger, 137 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799, 803-04 (1975).
3. Nonmarital cohabitation increased by 700% from 1960 to 1970. 2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, PERSONS BY FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 137 (1974).
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289(D) (Supp. 1979).
5. Id
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constitutional problems of regulating private sexual behavior.6
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Alimony payments to the wife originated under the authority of
the ecclesiastic courts of England.7 The ecclesiastic courts could grant
a divorce a mensa et thoro, authorizing the husband and wife to live
apart without severing the marriage bonds.8 The alimony awarded was
based on the husband's continuing duty to support the wife9 and was
measured by the wife's property over which the husband, by law of
curtesy, had total control; the lack of employment opportunities for the
married woman; and the degree of the husband's fault in the failure of
the relationship.' °
In the United States, absolute divorce, divorce a vinculo ma-
trimonii, rather than divorce a mensa et thoro, is authorized and con-
trolled by state law." The acceptance of absolute divorce in early
6. See, e.g., for a progression of Supreme Court interpretations of fundamental rights, Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation is a fundamental right); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception and fundamental right to marital privacy); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 112 (1967) (fundamental right to marry); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (fundamental right to marry and divorce); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bol-
ton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (fundamental right to abortion). "If the right of privacy means anything
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). This ruling extended the right of privacy in
contraception to single as well as married people. The issue in this instance was whether the
individual's right of privacy extends to cohabitation. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari to
Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979) (woman denied custody of children because cohabiting
with member of opposite sex), they may delineate the standards for interfering with an individ-
ual's chosen lifestyle.
See also for the progressive development of the right of association, Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upheld limitation on two people living together outside "family");
Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (extended "traditional family" beyond nucleus of
parent and child as fundamental right of association); United States Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (the government cannot use the threat of withholding food stamps in
order to foster "traditional family" concepts); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (cannot pre-
sume the unwed father as less significant in parent-child relationship).
The holding in United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno that government economic sup-
port cannot be used to penalize parties living outside a legal marriage upholds the fundamental
right of association. The question remains whether the private individual's economic support can
be withheld by state law to penalize nonmarital cohabitation.
7. 2 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 104 (1935). See generally Bradney, Why Pay
41imony, 32 ILL. L. REv. 295 (1937).
8. CLARK, supra note 1, at § 14.1 (1968).
9. Id
10. I.d If the wife were at fault for the dissolution of the marital relations, no alimony was
awarded. Cases in this area are collected in Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 313 (1954). The theory would
appear to be that the alimony decree enforces the husband's duty to support his wife, and that her
misconduct removes that duty. 2 VERNIER, supra note 7, at 266.
1I. A divorce a vinculo matrimonii dissolves the marriage bond and releases the parties from
1980]
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America probably resulted from the Protestant Reform attitudes of the
colonists. 2 Alimony has been awarded since colonial times.13
The original policy justification of alimony-the continuance of
the husband's duty to support-is not compatible with the absolute di-
vorce decree. To the extent that alimony developed as a replacement
for the common law right to support in a divorce a mensa el thoro, it
should not have been applied to the absolute divorce decree which sev-
ers all legal ties between the two parties. 14 Furthermore, the expanded
employment opportunities for women and their legal rights to own
property and enter into contractual relations negate the historical crite-
ria used in determining the need for support. t5
The courts, nevertheless, have formulated new policy justifications
for awarding alimony payments to the dependent spouse. These poli-
cies include such concepts as preventing the dependent spouse from
becoming an economic liability on the state; providing for the care of
their marital obligations. A divorce a mensa el thoro is a partial divorce, by which the parties are
separated and forbidden to live together, without affecting the marriage itself. Pennsylvania still
grants a divorce a mensa et thoro, but in most jurisdictions this status is a legal separation.
The action for separate maintenance is often said to have as its purpose the support
of the wife, while divorce from bed and board is to affect the requirement of marital
cohabitation. The fact is, however, that both actions contemplate that the parties will
live apart, but that they will remain married to each other in the sense that they wili not
be free to marry anyone else. And both actions can result in decrees which order the
husband to support his wife. . . . The two actions are sometimes distinguished by saying
that separate maintenance permits the parties to live apart, while divorce from bed and
board compels them to ...
[Case] results show that the only real difference between separate maintenance and
divorce from bed and board turns on the effect of reconciliation. Reconciliation termi-
nates obligations under most separate maintenance decrees but not those of divorce from
bed and board. . . If the parties are living apart by virtue of a separate maintenance
decree, an offer of reconciliation made in good faith by the losing defendant (that is, the
wrongdoer) places upon the plaintiff the duty of accepting the offer or being labelled a
deserter and losing the benefits of the separate maintenance decree. An offer of reconcil-
iation has no such effect, apparently no effect at all, if the parties are living apart under a
divorce from bed and board.
CLARK, supra note I, at 192-93.
12. See 2 HowARD, A HIsTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONs 60-85 (1904).
13. CLARK, supra note 1, at 421. There are two states which do not grant alimony after an
absolute decree of divorce. Texas, which has a community property system under which both
parties receive a share of community assets, TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.63. (Vernon 1975),
provides alimony only until the final decree of divorce is granted. Id at § 3.59. The parties may
contract, however, for lump sum or future periodic payments which are not categorized as ali-
mony. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967).
Pennsylvania, a non-community property state, allows alimony when the divorce is pendente
lite, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 46 (Purdon 1974); when divorce from bed and board (a mensa el
thoro) is granted, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 47 (Purdon 1929); when a party is insane, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 45 (Purdon 1929); or when a party is suffering from a serious mental disorder, 23
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 48 (Purdon 1972).
14. CLARK, supra note 1, at § 14.1.
15. Id
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the children of the marriage while they are minors; in the case of a
long-term marriage, returning an investment in marriage property; and
punishing the guilty party for the wrongs suffered by the innocent
party. 16 As no-fault divorce' 7 becomes more prevalent, the criteria for
awarding alimony focuses more on the payee's actual need and the
payor's ability to pay. Most alimony is now awarded only if it is rea-
sonably expected that the dependent party will become self-support-
16. But ef Richards v. Richards, 44 Hawaii 491, 355 P.2d 188 (1960) (alimony is not awarded
as punishment); Bouma v. Bouma, 439 P.2d 198 (Okla. 1968). See also, Clark, supra note 1, at
§ 14.5.
Delaware recently revised the alimony statute to reflect the growing trend toward awarding
temporary maintenance:
(a) The Court may grant alimony for a dependent party as follows:
(1) Temporary alimony for either party during the pendency of an action for
divorce or annulment;
(2) Alimony for a respondent commencing after the entry of a decree dissolving
an irretrievably broken marriage characterized by mental illness; or
(3) Alimony for a petitioner, or for a respondent who does not qualify for ali-
mony under paragraph (2) of this subsection, commencing after the entry of a de-
cree of divorce or annulment but not to continue for more than 2 years after
marriage dissolution unless the parties were married for more than 20 years.
(b) A party is dependent if the party or someone on behalf of the party shall aver in
an affidavit of dependency filed in the action and shall prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that such party:
(1) Is dependent upon the other party for support and the other party is not
contractually or otherwise obligated to provide that support after the entry of a de-
cree of divorce or annulment;
(2) Lacks sufficient property including any award of marital property, to pro-
vide for the party's reasonable needs; and
(3) Is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment or
is the custodian of a child whose condition qr circumstances make it appropriate
that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
(c) The alimony order shall be in such amounts and for such time, except as limited
in time under subsection (a) of this section, as the Court shall deem just without regard
to marital misconduct and after considering all relevant factors justified by the evidence,
including:
(1) Financial resources of the party seeking alimony including marital property
apportioned to him or her, and his or her ability to meet his or her needs indepen-
dently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with
such party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(2) Time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party seeking alimony to find appropriate employment;
(3) Standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) Duration of the marriage;
(5) Age, and the physical and emotional condition of the party seeking ali-
mony;
(6) Ability of the other party to meet his or her needs while meeting those of the
party seeking alimony; and
(7) Tax consequences.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512 (Supp. 1979).
17. For a breakdown of the various grounds for divorce as of August 1, 1977, see Freed and
Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 3 Fain. L. Rep. 4047 (1977).
The result of the requirement of fault as a ground for divorce often led to perjury or collusive
actions by the parties in order to end a marriage. See Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without
Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32, 44 (1966).
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ing.1t This policy of assisting the dependent party until self-sufficient
reflects the increasing employment and competitiveness of women in
the work force. Self-sufficiency can also be furthered by terminating
alimony payments upon the remarriage of the payee.19 The termina-
tion of alimony payments upon remarriage apparently is an extension
of the husband's common law duty to support. Since the remarriage
imposes the duty of support on the new spouse, the paying spouse of
the former marriage is released from that duty.20 The payee receives
support from the new spouse and therefore is no longer dependent
upon the former spouse. State statutes generally provide for termina-
tion of alimony when a subsequent marriage of the payee has been
solemnized. 21  The dramatic alteration of social attitudes toward un-
married cohabitation, however, has created a gap in the law governing
termination of alimony.
The early English law did not grant absolute divorce and it was
not uncommon to require an ex-wife to live a chaste life.22 The devel-
opment of absolute divorce certainly did not support this duty to re-
main chaste to a party who is no longer one's spouse. Nevertheless, as
the number of unmarried couples living together increases, courts are
being asked to provide relief from alimony payments for the supporting
18. The Maryland Senate recently passed Senate Bill 811. Favorable action on the compan-
ion House Bill 1810 is expected. Section one authorizes the awarding of alimony in connection
with divorce or annulment without regard to fault and sets forth criteria which are relevant to the
amount of the award. Section one provides further.
[T]hat the court shall determine the period during which alimony shall be paid.
This 'fixed-time,' at the end of which alimony obligations automatically cease, is con-
ceived to be an incentive to attaining self-sufficiency by the recipient, and would be tied
to a specific program or goal leading to that end. This section also provides for exten-
sions of the fixed period set by the court, and for the award of alimony for an indefinite
period should the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that result.
6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2360 (1980).
19. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289 (Supp. 1979). The Oklahoma statute allows the
recipient to petition the court within 90 days of remarriage for assessment of the change of circum-
stances giving rise to the automatic termination of alimony. If the recipient sufficiently convinces
the court that "some amount of support is still needed and that circumstances have not rendered
payment of the same inequitable," the alimony will be reinstated. Id
20. See, e.g., Wear v. Boydston, 320 Ark. 580, 324 S.W.2d 337 (1959). "We have no quarrel
with the statement that alimony payments should cease upon the divorced wife's remarriage, for
we see no logic in requiring a first husband to contribute at regular intervals to an ex-wife whose
care and maintenance has been assumed by a second husband." 324 S.W.2d at 339.
21. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289(B) (Supp. 1979).
22. Waddlington, Sexual Relations After Separation or Divorce: The New Morality and the
Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L. Rav. 249, 265 (1977). The durn sola et casta vixerit clause,
or clause for payment while she remains single and chaste, developed under the fault-oriented
policy and the divorce a mensa et thoro. For a further discussion of dum casta clauses see Cour-
son v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 129 A.2d 917 (1957). See generally, notes 10-11 supra and accompa-
nying text.
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ex-spouse.23 "[It is now being asserted that the payor should be re-
lieved from further obligation to support an ex-spouse because of the
latter's post-divorce sexual conduct even when no legal remarriage has
occurred."24
The new sexual openness in today's society reflects what appears
to be an unwillingness to enter into a relationship involving legal
ramifications. "[The friendlier attitude toward unmarried cohabita-
tion that has resulted from [marriage's] displacement from its tradi-
tional pedestal is more accurately described as a worldly acceptance
than a mere tolerance."25 Nevertheless, the payor rarely is willing to
provide maintenance to an unforeseen third party and is requesting
that legal consequences be imposed upon the cohabiting payee. Co-
habitation has created a gap in the law when a "legal remarriage" is the
condition precedent to termination or modification of support pay-
ments.
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE GAP
A. Judicial Response
The majority of states have statutes which authorize upward and
downward modification of alimony based upon proof of changed cir-
cumstances.26 The modification of alimony when the payee cohabitates
has been justified by the courts of these states under the guise of the
change of circumstances test. In order to understand the numerous,
and often conflicting, judicial evaluations of cohabitation, it is neces-
sary to review case law from several jurisdictions. The judicial deci-
sions which follow are chosen not as a statement of the law, but as
examples of how current courts apply the law in an attempt to meet the
challenge that unwed cohabitation represents.
A few jurisdictions have refused to penalize a dependent ex-spouse
on the sole basis of conduct after an absolute divorce has been en-
tered.27 "Alimony is based on the obligation to support an ex-wife and
23. See Marriage of Vaughn, 25 Or. App. 655, 550 P.2d 1243 (1976). This comment does not
attempt to discuss the rights of the parties within a nonmarital relationship. For a clear discussion
of the legal ramifications of this type of relationship, see Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557
P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); Sexual Relations, supra note 22.
24. Sexual Relations, supra note 22, at 266.
25. The Course of Change in Family Law 1978-79, 5 Fain. L. Rep. 4013, 4018 (1979).
26. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 452-65.
27. See, e.g., Drummond v. Drummond, 590 S.W.2d 658 (Ark. 1979); Bowman v. Bowman,
163 Neb. 336, 79 N.W.2d 554 (1956).
1980]
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is not to be measured in the future by her chastity or moral conduct. 28
The duty to support does not imply any duty of proper conduct.
29
This refusal to consider the sexual conduct of the alimony recipi-
ent may be unfair to the payor. Foreclosing modification of alimony
when the payee is cohabitating with a nqw partner without considering
economic need may encourage nonmarital relationships, since the ben-
efits of alimony payments and of support from the paramour may be
realized simultaneously.
The majority of jurisdictions have approached the problem by rec-
ognizing that cohabitation with a third party may result in a substantial
change of circumstance warranting reduction or termination of support
payments. Generally, the substantial change of circumstance the courts
look for is a diminished economic need.3 0 The courts have established
28. Fleming v. Fleming, 221 Kan. 290, 559 P.2d 329, 332 (1977).
29. Bowman v. Bowman, 163 Neb. 336, 79 N.W.2d 554, 562 (1956). Just as the conduct of
the ex-wife is not a ground for terminating alimony, neither will the sexual conduct of the hus-
band afford grounds for increasing alimony payments. Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9, 14
(D.C. Ct. App. 1977).
30. O'Dell v. O'Dell, 57 Ala. App. 185, 326 So. 2d 747 (1976); Byrd v. Byrd, 252 Ark. 202, 478
S.W.2d 45 (1972); Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977); Meyer v. Meyer, 41
Md. App. 13, 394 A.2d 1220 (Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Abbott v. Abbott, 282 N.W.2d 561 (Minn.
1979); Garlinger v. Garlinger, 137 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (1975); Grossman v. Grossman,
128 N.J. Super. 193, 319 A.2d 508 (Ch. Div. 1974); Brister v. Brister, 92 N.M. 711, 594 P.2d 1167
(1979); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 399,350 N.E.2d 413 (1976); Marriage of Vaughn, 25 Or. App.
655, 550 P.2d 1243 (1976).
Two recent cases illustrate exceptional judicial logic in applying the economic need test. In
Kerner v. Kerner, 5 Fam. L. Rep. 2548 (Me. 1979), although emphasizing that post-divorce cohab-
itation does not automatically terminate alimony, the court decided that "where the facts demon-
strate that a person receiving alimony is living in a relationship with all the attributes of husband
and wife except the formal legal bond of marriage, that relationship willpresumplively terminate a
former spouse's alimony obligation . I..." ld at 2549 (emphasis added). Apparently, the pre-
sumption is that the former spouse's duty to support has been assumed by the paramour. Al-
though an economic need standard is still applied, the burden of proof has been shifted to the
person receiving alimony. In this particular case, however, the court seemed to be persuaded by
the fact that the couple's reason for not marrying appears to have been the belief that they would
be better off financially if they did not marry. Id
In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 5 Fain. L. Rep. 2127 (Minn. 1978), the court faced the more
difficult problem of homosexual cohabitation.
There is nothing in the relative financial conditions of the parties which would jus-
tify a termination of alimony. There has been, however, a basic change in the assump-
tions which underlie the stipulation: defendant has discovered that her sexual
orientation is lesbian. She has entered into an apprently stable love relationship with a
woman friend.
At the time of the 1972 divorce plaintiff could have realistically assumed that de-
fendant would remarry. Defendant was 30 years old. Plaintiff would not have entered
into a stipulation to pay alimony until defendant remarried or died had he realize [sic]
remarriage was or would become impossible.
Defendant's post-decree lesbianism is a material change in circumstances which jus-
tifies the termination of alimony.
Id
The court, however, continued alimony payments until July 1, 1980, to enable the defendant
7
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distinguishable tests for determining the effect cohabitation has on eco-
nomic need.3 ' To the unwary, the language may seem the same, but
the courts' placement of the burden of persuasion required to terminate
alimony payments may be decisive 2.3
Some courts' language reflects a policy that post-divorce cohabita-
tion is not evidence at all of changed financial circumstances.3 3  This
position evaluates the relationship's effect upon the need for support
only if economic need has been substantially changed and does not
look at the nature of the relationship itself.3 4 Another stricter economic
circumstance test requires proof that the alimony recipient's paramour
has assumed the responsibility of support. This assumption of the duty
to support releases the former husband from the common law duty of
support.35 This is the strictest application of the change of circumstance
test because cohabitation affects alilmony payments only if it is proven
that the paramour supports the payee.
The prevailing economic need test has been clearly defined in
Garlinger v. Garlinger3 6 and has been used by other courts in determin-
ing termination of alimony.3 7 The Garlinger test recognizes two situa-
tions which create a substantial change in economic circumstances: (1)
when the paramour contributes to the payee's support or (2) when the
paramour resides in the payee's home without contributing his share of
the expenses .3  These two variations protect the former spouse from
incidentially supporting an unforeseen third party and prevent the ali-
mony recipient from receiving unneeded support. In a situation where
to become self-supporting. Therefore, the court determined a future date upon which the eco-
nomic need test met the requirement for terminating alimony.
31. See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, 252 Ark. 202, 478 S.W.2d 45, 46 (1972) (remarriage rule requires
contribution to support or relationship meeting common law marriage test); Meyer v. Meyer, 41
Md. App. 13, 394 A.2d 1220, 1224 (1978) (conduct may be considered if relevant to economic
need); Brister v. Brister, 92 N.M. 711, 594 P.2d 1167 (1979) (support contributed by live-in lover is
a factor); Marriage of Vaughn, 25 Or. App. 655, 550 P.2d 1243, 1245 (1976) (based on the showing
of a change in financial circumstances by reason of the cohabitation).
32. California's statute includes a rebuttable presumption against the party cohabiting, thus
placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5(a) (West Supp.
1979). See notes 48-53 infra and accompanying text.
33. Abbott v. Abbott, 282 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 1979). "We conclude that the existence of a
meretricious relationship does not constitute, simply by reason of the nature of the relationship,
sufficient ground for the termination of alimony." Id at 566. See also O'Dell v. O'Dell, 57 Ala.
App. 185, 326 So. 2d 747 (1976); Brister v. Brister, 92 N.M. 711, 594 P.2d 1167 (1979).
34. 282 N.W.2d at 566.
35. Byrd v. Byrd, 252 Ark. 202,478 S.W.2d 45 (1972); Fahrer v. Fahrer, 36 Ohio App. 2d 208,
304 N.E.2d 411 (1973).
36. 137 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (1975).
37. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413, 426 (1976).
38. 347 A.2d at 803.
1980]
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the recipient still requires the alimony for living expenses in spite of the
new relationship and can demonstrate the need to the court, the ali-
mony is not terminated.39 If only a portion of the alimony is still
needed, modification rather than termination may result.4 0 The ration-
ale in Garlinger is based upon realistic financial need. This is evi-
denced further by the revival of alimony payments when the
cohabitation ends if economic need is re-established,41 protecting the
state from the burden of providing welfare support.
B. Legislative Response
Some states have attempted to resolve the problem of cohabitation
and alimony through legislation. Since 1934, New York courts have
had statutory authority to terminate alimony upon proof that the recip-
ient is "habitually living with another man and holding herself out as
"142his wife, although not married to such man.... 
The New York statute's43 two-part test appears to ignore econom-
ics as an element of change of circumstances necessary to terminate
alimony, and by court interpretation allows for modification." The
strict two-part test45 is so closely akin to the common law marriage,
however, that the economic test may be hidden within the defacto mar-
riage requirement, since the new partner is presumed to have assumed
39. Id
40. Id Cohabitation is a factor only to the extent that the relationship alters economic needs.
If the paramour contributes to the support of the payee or resides in the home of the payee with-
out paying a share of the household expenses, the two-part test may be a "change of circumstances
sufficient to entitle the [payor] to relief." Id
41. Id at 804. See also Brister v. Brister, 92 N.M. 711, 594 P.2d 1167 (1979) (since the wife's
relationship with her live-in lover had ended, no grounds for modifying alimony existed).
42. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1964).
43. Id
44. But see Hall v. Hall, 82 Misc. 2d 814, 372 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1975), aft'd, 55 A.D.2d 752, 389
N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976). The court ruled that although the statutory language provides only for ter-
mination, the court has the discretion to reduce alimony payments. 372 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
45. N. Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1964).
Where an action for divorce or for annulment or for a declaration of the nullity of a
void marriage is brought by a husband or wife, and a finaljudgment of divorce or a final
judgment annulling the marriage or declaring its nullity has been rendered, the court, by
order upon the application of the husband on notice, and on proof of the marriage of the
wife after such final judgment, must modify such final judgment and any orders made
with respect thereto by annulling the provisions of such final judgment or orders, or of
both, directing payments of money for the support of the wife. The court in its discretion
upon application of the husband on notice, upon proof that the wife is habitually living
with another man and holding herself out as his wife, although not married to such man,
may modify such final judgment and any orders made with respect thereto by annulling
the provisions of such final judgment or orders or of both, directing payment of money
for the support of such wife.
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the duty of support.4 6 This theory focuses on the relationship of the
parties, rather than the support needs of the cohabiting spouse.
In 1974, California enacted a law terminating alimony upon proof
that the payee was "living with a person of the opposite sex and hold-
ing himself or herself out as the spouse of the person for a total of thirty
days or more, either consecutive or non-consecutive, although not mar-
ried to the person."'47 California substantially changed the.language of
the statute in 1976 by providing:
Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing,
there shall be a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden
of proof, of decreased need for support if the supported party
is cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex. Upon such a
finding of changed circumstances, the court may modify the
payment of support . *48
The 1976 version of the California law, while eliminating the
"holding out" provision in the 1974 version, added that "later modifi-
cation of support upon proof of change of circumstances" is possible.4 9
More significantly, the statute created the rebuttable presumption of
decreased need. It should be noted that the term "cohabitation" means
more than sharing living accommodations50 ; it involves an exchange of
services with full credit to the economic value of such services.5 The
exchange of services includes cooking, cleaning, and other household
tasks, but not sexual favors.52
Logical analysis would indicate that the Legislature created
the presumption against a cohabiting former spouse sup-
ported by a divorced husband or wife based on thinking that
46. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (West Supp. 1979) (cited in In re Marriage of Lieb, 80 Cal.
App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1978)).
Upon the petition of a spouse who has been ordered to pay support under Section
4801, the court shall revoke the order for support upon proof that the spouse to whom
support has been ordered to be paid is living with a person of the opposite sex and
holding himself or herself out as the spouse of the person for a total of 30 days or more,
either consecutive or nonconsecutive, although not married to the person.
In re Marriage of Lieb, 80 Cal. App. 3d 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763, 765 (1978).
48. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801.5(a)(West Supp. 1979).
49. Id at § 4801.5(c).
50. Compare Lang v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 3d 852, 126 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1975) (con-
struing the 1974 statute) with In re Marriage of Lieb,'80 Cal. App. 3d 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763
(1978) (construing the 1976 statute).
51. In re Marriage of Lieb, 80 Cal. App. 3d 644, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763, 771 (1978).
52. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 770-71. The court considered the payee's services as "homemaker,
housekeeper, cook, and companion," for which she might have been compensated outside the
nonmarital relationship. These services, however, must be balanced against the economic support
contributed by the paramour in order to prove fair and reasonable value of all services. Id
1980]
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cohabitation establishes a status for the benefit of the sup-
ported spouse and such status therefore creates a change of
circumstances so tied in with the payment of spousal support
as to be significant enough by itself to require a re-examina-
tion of whether such need for support continues in such a way
that it still should be charged to the prior spouse.53
Alabama enacted a statute, effective April 27, 1978, mandating
modification of the divorce decree to terminate alimony payments if
the person receiving alimony lives openly or cohabits with a member of
the opposite sex.54 The complaining party must prove the cohabitation
to warrant the alimony termination. 5  The Alabama Appeals Court, in
interpreting the cohabitation standard, found:
[T]he legislature intended to strike a balance between the oc-
casional brief sojourn and the common-law marriage. Thus
while not every occurrence of post-marital unchastity by a
former spouse will bar the right to alimony, a petitioner need
not prove the former spouse is habitually living with another
and that the couple consider themselves married.5 6
Georgia's current statute concerning termination of alimony be-
came effective April 4, 1979.: The test involved in this statute requires
voluntary cohabitation with a third party in a meretricious relation-
ship.5 8 Cohabitation is defined by the statute to mean dwelling to-
gether continuously and openly in a meretricious relationship with a
53. Id at 771.
54. ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 (Supp. 1979).
Any decree of divorce providing for periodic payments of alimony shall be modified
by the court to provide for the termination of such alimony upon petition of a party to
the decree and proof that the spouse receiving such alimony has remarried or that such
spouse is living openly or cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex. This provision
shall be applicable to any person granted a decree of divorce either prior to April 28,
1978, or thereafter, provided, however, that no payments of alimony already received
shall have to be reimbursed.
1d
55. Id
56. Parish v. Parish, 374 So. 2d 348, 349 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (citations omitted).
57. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220(b)(Supp. 1979).
Subsequent to a final judgment of divorce awarding periodic payment of alimony
for the support of a spouse, the voluntary cohabitation of such former spouse with a
third party in a meretricious relationship shall also be grounds to modify provisions
made for periodic payments of permanent alimony for the support of such former
spouse. As used herein, the word cohabitation shall mean dwelling together continu-
ously and openly in a meretricious relationship with a person of the opposite sex. In the
event the petitioner does not prevail in the petition for modification on the ground as set
forth herein, petitioner shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the re-
spondent for the defense of the said action.
Id
58. Id
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person of the opposite sex.5 9 The case law in Georgia prior to the en-
actment of this statute required a common law marriage in order to
terminate alimony payments.6"
The statutes of Alabama and Georgia6 do not include an eco-
nomic test within the statutory language. They do require, however, an
open, continuous living arrangement which would appear to adopt the
de facto marriage policy of New York.62 Since these laws are new,
state courts hopefully will interpret the language to require some de-
gree of support from the paramour, or at least allow the payee to prove
the continued need for economic support when applicable. The Geor-
gia high court appeared to use an economic test based upon the par-
amour's contribution in Morris v. Morris6" when "sharing living
quarters (and thus expenses) with another" was held to be sufficient to
modify alimony payments.' 4
Illinois' statute terminating marriage upon cohabitation became
effective October 1, 1977.65 The test included in the statute states that
"if the party receiving maintenance cohabits with another person on a
resident, continuing conjugal basis" the alimony is terminated.66 This
is the only statute that does not refer to a member of the opposite sex
when referring to the cohabiting partner.
The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted that statute in In re Sup-
port of Haford.Y The court decided that the legislature intended con-
duct to be grounds for terminating alimony68 and then defined the
conduct required.
We believe that it was the intention of our legislature to pro-
vide for the termination of an ex-spouse's obligation to pay
59. Id
60. See Taylor v. Taylor, 243 Ga. 506, 255 S.E.2d 32 (1979); Lindwall v. Lindwall, 242 Ga.
13, 247 S.E.2d 752 (1978).
61. ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 (Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220(b) (Supp. 1979).
62. See notes 42-43 supra and acompanying text. The term defacto marriage is used since
New York has abolished the common-law marriage.
The defacto marriage is tantamount to a common law marriage in that the relationship
requires habitually living together and holding oneself out as married. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 248 (MeKinney) 1964). Eg., Sims v. Sims, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2485 (Ga. 1980) (cohabitation
interpreted as voluntary relationship similar in nature to marriage). See generally Clark, The New
Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L. J. 441 (1976).
63. 244 Ga. 120, 259 S.E.2d 65 (1979).
64. 259 S.E.2d at 67.
65. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 510(b) (Supp. 1979). "[I]f the party receiving maintenance co-
habits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis." Id
66. Id
67. 70 Ill. App. 3d 609, 388 N.E.2d 1131 (1979).
68. Id. at 1134.
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future maintenance whenever the spouse receiving the main-
tenance has entered into a husband-wife relationship with an-
other, whether this be by legal or other means.
We believe that this statute contemplates acts of sexual
intercourse as part of the full or defacto husband-wife rela-
tionship which it seeks to describe. The term "cohabitation"
means living together as husband and wife, but does not nec-
essarily imply sexual intercourse . . . . "Conjugal basis,"
however, implies the assertion of conjugal rights which have
been defined both as "the right which husband and wife have
to each other's society, comfort and affection" . . . and "the
right of sexual intercourse between husband and wife" ....
The statute further requires that the cohabitation be on a resi-
dent and continuing basis.69
The court in Halford determined two elements of the required
conduct: a husband-wife relationship and a continuous relationship.
The appellate court of Illinois in In re Bramson7  decided that the hus-
band-wife relationship had not been established since there had been
no commingling of funds, no use of the paramour's name, and no
monogomous dating relationship.7 The court apparently ruled that, to
avoid punishing the conduct per se, more than sexual relations was nec-
essary. "Rather, an important consideration, divorced from the moral-
ity of conduct, is whether the cohabitation has materially affected the
recipient spouse's need for support because she either received support
from her co-resident or used maintenance monies to support him. 72
This is the Garlinger test.73
In jurisdictions which treat cohabitation as a defacto marriage, it
is probable that once the alimony is terminated, it may not be revived
after the liason ends.74 The refusal to revive alimony defeats the objec-
tives of alimony support,"7 and may necessitate court interference in
the rights of the parties within the nonmarital relationship. For exam-
ple, if alimony is permanently terminated because cohabitation has
been treated as a defacto marriage, the payee may have to become a
69. Id
70. 6 FAM. L. REP1. (BNA) 2486 (IM. App. Ct. 1980).
71. Id at 2486-87.
72. Id at 2488.
73. Garlinger v. Garlinger, 173 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799. See note 38 supra and accom-
panying text.
74. Hardwick v. Hardwick, 5 Faro. L. Rep. 2477 (N.Y. 1979); CLARK, supra note 1, at 457-58.
75. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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welfare recipient when the cohaitation ends. In order to avoid ex-
panding the state welfare rolls, the courts might expand the definition
of defacto marriage to include the duty of support and order the par-
amour to support the payee. Statutes based on an express economic
need test, as in California, merely suspend alimony payments during
cohabitation and provide the authority to reinstate them when the two
parties end the cohabitation.76 This is a better way to protect the pay-
ing spouse and yet support the economic interest of the state.
IV. THE OKLAHOMA STATUTE
Oklahoma revised its alimony statute, effective October 1, 1979,
and for the first time provided for reduction or termination of alimony
on grounds other than death or remarriage:
The voluntary cohabitation of a former spouse with a mem-
ber of the opposite sex shall be a ground to modify provisions
of a final judgment or order for alimony as support. If volun-
tary cohabitation is alleged. . .. the court shall. . . reduce
or terminate support payments upon proof of substantial
change of circumstances relating to need for support or ability
to support. As used herein, cohabitation shall mean the
dwelling together continuously and habitually of a man and a
woman who are in a private conjugal relationship not solem-
nized as a marriage according to law, or not necessarily meet-
ing all the standards of a common-law marriage.?
The statute incorporates a built-in economic test, without a pre-
sumption of decreased need, applying the change of circumstances test
to the need for or ability to support. The Oklahoma legislature appar-
ently determined that the change of circumstances test used in other
states to modify alimony should be used in reducing or terminating
alimony when a former spouse cohabitates. The legislature presuma-
bly wanted to continue the policy of nonmodifiable alimony in
Oklahoma except when an ex-spouse cohabitates. It is significant to
note that under the statute modification is limited to reduction or ter-
mination with no provision for increased alimony payments. Never-
theless, because the statute requires a change in the need for support or
in the ability to pay, cohabitation is not necessarily proof that support
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5(c) (West Supp. 1979). See also Note, Domestic Relations-No
Revival ofA/imony Following an Annulled 'Remarriage', 43 Mo. L. REv. 591 (1978); note 89 infra.
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289(D) (Supp. 1979).
1980]
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should be terminated. Moreover it is not clear if the Garlinger test,"8
which requires either the paramour's contribution to the support of the
alimony recipient or the paramour's total lack of contribution toward
his own expenses, could be used by the Oklahoma courts. The lan-
guage of the statute is ambiguous as can best be illustrated by examin-
ing the phrases "cohabitation of a former spouse," "need for support,"
and "ability to support" in light of several hypothetical situations.
The Oklahoma statute does not limit cohabitation sanctions to the
party receiving alimony. Therefore, it is arguable that if the payor
cohabitates, the "ability to support" clause could reduce or terminate
the alimony payment obligation. The payor, for example, may claim
that the expenses of the new living arrangement necessitate the reduc-
tion of alimony payments. Oklahoma's policy of nonmodifiable ali-
mony, however, does not allow the payor to reduce or terminate
alimony payments upon remarriage.79 This means that the payor
might receive an economic benefit by cohabiting but not by remarry-
ing. It is inequitable to release the payor from the support obligation
when the payee is not the party cohabiting. Because the innocent payee
would .suffer if alimony is terminated when the payor cohabits, it is
more probable that the court would allow the payee to prove continu-
ing "need for support" and deny modification based on equitable prin-
ciples.
The cohabiting payor problem becomes more complex if the payee
cannot prove a continuing "need for support." Since Oklahoma does
not allow reduction or termination of alimony payments except upon
death, remarriage, or cohabitation, the payor can benefit from cohabi-
tation if the payee has made any progress toward self-sufficiency. Al-
though the payor's remarriage cannot benefit the payor by affecting the
alimony obligation, the payor can benefit from the statutory definition
of cohabitation and the new remedy which accompanys it. For the first
time, the payee may suffer a loss of alimony if the. payee has entered
the job market. This would reward the payor for cohabiting and penal-
ize the payee for seeking economic independence.
In a third hypothetical, if the payor receives a monetary benefit
from a live-in lover, the payee cannot rely on the payor's cohabitation
78. Garlinger v. Garlinger, 137 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (1975). See notes 36-38 supra
and accompanying text.
79. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289(B) (1971). Alimony may be terminated by death or remar-
riage of the recipient. For expressions of the view that second families' needs should be taken into
account, see Spingola v. Spingola, 91 N.M. 737, 580 P.2d 958 (1978).
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to modify alimony upwards since the statute limits modification to re-
duction or termination. As a result, the payee will probably not seek
modification under the Oklahoma statute. No benefits will accrue to
the payee from the payor's cohabitation nor can the payee's alimony
payments increase as a result of the payee's cohabitation. The statute is
designed to aid only the payor by reducing or terminating alimony pay-
ments.
Since the cohabitation statute affords a one-sided payor remedy, it
is even more important that the courts scrutinize the relationships and
apply the economic tests used in Garlinger.0 Cohabitation triggers the
right of the payor to petition the court for reduction or termination of
alimony payments. Unless the "need for support" is limited to the eco-
nomic consequence of the payee's cohabitation and is always used by
the court in applying the change of circumstances test, the payee is pe-
nalized for cohabitation, whereas the payor is rewarded for cohabita-
tion.
Under the Garlinger81 test parties are penalized for their conduct
only if the paramour supports the payee or if the payee supports the
paramour. Both situations indicate a lack of need. The payee contin-
ues to receive the alimony payments if the paramour neither contrib-
utes nor receives support. Thus, the payee is not penalized for conduct
if no change in economic need results from the relationship. The re-
quirement of proof of economic benefit from the relationship also pre-
vents deterring the payee from achieving economic independence, since
only the paramour's effect on economic need is used to determine re-
duction or termination of alimony payments.
The ambiguous language of the statute may be applied to the par-
amour. The "ability to pay" clause of the statute may be used by the
court to evaluate the paramour's failure to contribute support. If the
Oklahoma courts extend the "ability to pay" clause to the paramour
who is unwilling to support the payee, it is the cohabitation, not the
change of circumstances, which triggers the reduction or termination of
alimony payments. The payee is therefore punished for conduct.
It is also unclear under the statute how long the cohabitation must
continue before the payor can petition the court for relief. The lan-
guage "continuously and habitually" is probably longer than the one
80. 137 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (1975).
81. Id
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night required in a common law marriage.8 2 The Oklahoma courts will
have to define the period of time in which a relationship must exist
before relief from alimony payments may be granted.
The statute's provision that cohabitation may occur when a couple
continuously lives together while "not necessarily meeting all the stan-
dards of a common-law marriage ' 8 3 is also ambiguous. Whether the
legislature meant any element for establishing a common law marriage
could be absent or whether it meant a specific element is conjecture.
The most probable elements of common law marriage not to be re-
quired are the intent to enter into a marital relationship and the intent
to enter into a permanent relationship, neither of which are commonly
present in non-marital relationships. If either of these two conditions
are required to modify alimony, the payee would be able to avoid the
consequences of the statute.
Since Oklahoma alimony law does not provide for the upward
modification of alimony, it is questionable whether the original ali-
mony award may be reinstated if the cohabitation which resulted in a
modification terminates. If the conduct of the payee is the key element
it is possible that courts would refuse to revive alimony after forfeiture.
On the other hand, the courts could easily decide to revive the alimony
after cohabitation ends and the payee can establish economic need.
This better policy would support the state's interest in lessening welfare
demands of the payee and would reward the payee for ending the "mis-
conduct."
In Rice v. Rice,84 rendered before the effective date of the new ali-
mony statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed a ruling by a
lower court which had terminated the alimony rights of an ex-wife for
82. In Oklahoma, once the elements of intent and cohabitation are satisfied, the common law
marriage ripens immediately. See, e.g., Earley v. State Indus. Comm'n, 269 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1954);
Tiuna v. Willmott, 162 Okla. 42, 19 P.2d 145 (1933).
83. Note 77 supra and accompanying text.
Matter of Estate of Bouse, 583 P.2d 514 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
[T]o establish a common-law marriage there must be ... [a]n actual and mutual
agreement to enter into a matrimonial relation, permanent and exclusive of all others,
between parties capable in law of making such a contract, consumated by their cohabita-
tion as man and wife, or their mutual assumption openly of marital duties and obliga-
tions."
Id at 517 (citing Daniels v. Mohon, 350 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1960); Bothwell v. Way, 44 Okla. 555, 145
P. 350 (1914)).
84. 603 P.2d 1125 (Okla. 1979). After the divorce was granted, the couple lived together in
an attempt to reconcile. While living together, the wife made her car payments, which was the
amount of alimony awarded in the divorce decree. After separating permanently, the wife asked
the court to enforce the alimony award.
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cohabiting with her former husband. 5 The supreme court decided that
the wife had "merely waived her right to alimony during the period of
cohabitation with her former husband. ' 86 The court held that under
the statute then applicable alimony could not be terminated unless
there had been a remarriage.
The court seems to be supporting revival of alimony after an at-
tempted reconciliation. Nevertheless, if the same logic of suspending
alimony payments during a trial living arrangement as in Rice is ap-
plied to the termination of alimony in third party cohabitation cases,
alimony may be revived after the nonmarital relationship ends. It is
not clear that the legislature intended this result. Since the statute does
not require common law marriage, it is not unreasonable to assume
that the payor's duty to support is not extinguished by a defacto mar-
riage.""
The support obligation should not be permanently terminated, but
should be suspended once change in economic need has been shown.89
The alimony should be revived through the courts only after the rela-
tionship has ended and the former spouse can demonstrate sufficient
economic need. The revival of support should be limited to any time
period established in, and running from the date of, the divorce decree.
It should not be revived beyond the original time granted. Three dis-
tinct parties would benefit from limited revival of alimony: the payor
would be allowed some degree of economic freedom while payment is
suspended even though the support obligation might become effective
again after a hearing to re-establish need; the recipient would not be
penalized for sexual conduct and would have a source for support if
need could be re-established; and the state's interest in preventing the
payee's dependence on state welfare funds would be protected.
85. Id
86. Id at 1126.
87. Id
88. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
89. Cohabitation is distinguishable from an annulled remarriage in that the parties have not
entered into a legal relationship. Statutes in many states provide that the remarriage of the payee
terminates alimony payments. When the remarriage results in an annulment, courts have held
that the remarriage ceremony alone is sufficient to permanently terminate the support obligation,
Torgan v. Torgan, 159 Colo. 93, 410 P.2d 167 (1966); Richards v. Richards, 139 N.J. Super. 207,
353 A.2d 141 (1976); or that the remarriage is one factor used to determine if modification of
support payments is required under the change of circumstances test, Boiteau v. Boiteau, 227
Minn. 26, 33 N.W.2d 703 (1948). See also Note, Domestic Relations-No Revival of 41imony Fol-
lowing an Annulled "Remarriage", 43 Mo. L. REv. 591, 591-92 (1978).
1980] 789 *
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V. CONCLUSION
It is not uncommon for couples to live together without the legal
duties of marriage. The Oklahoma legislature has attempted to meet
the legal challenge of our changing social mores. Courts, however,
should not use statutory ambiguity to invade the privacy of these
couples. Instead, courts should balance the economic interest of the
party paying alimony against the economic need of the party receiving
alimony together with the interest of the state in providing support for
dependent ex-spouses. Modification of alimony awards should be
based not upon the moral conduct of the payee, but rather upon the
economic need of the payee.
In attempting to resolve the issue of whether alimony payments
should be made to an ex-spouse cohabiting with a third party, courts
should avoid punishing conduct. Once a marriage is dissolved, no duty
of sexual fidelity to the ex-spouse exists.9' The courts should not at-
tempt to control sexual conduct outside the marriage relationship un-
less children are involved. 9 ' Cohabitation may, however, affect the
recipient's need for support and justify decreasing or terminating the
alimony payment.
The Oklahoma statute is vulnerable to attack because it is unclear
what degree of cohabitation is required and who must cohabitate in
order to modify alimony payments. The courts should not allow the
payor to successfully modify alimony unless the payee cohabitates.
The Garlinger test92 reflects the standard needed for an economic
determination for modifying alimony. It is submitted that the optimum
economic test for alimony reduction would be either (1) if the par-
amour is contributing support, or (2) if the paramour is being sup-
ported by the payee. If either of those situations exists, the payor
should be released from the support obligation to the extent that the
payee's need has decreased.93 The alimony should be reinstated if the
payee proves increased need and if the cohabitation has ended. Only if
the Oklahoma courts measure the economic impact of the liason on ex-
90. Bowman v. Bowman, 163 Neb. 336, 79 N.W.2d 554, 562 (1956).
91. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1980) (ex-wife lost custody of children
upon proof of cohabitation).
92. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
93. This policy may have a coercive effect on the payee's right to enter into a nonmarital
relationship, but may be justified in terms of the state's interest in promoting marriage and by
limiting the decrease in alimony to the decrease in economic need.
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spousal finances can the purposes of alimony awards and the rights of
all parties involved be balanced.
Lillian Hamor
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